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1. Introduction 
 
Today, federal political systems are increasingly used by states with a multi-ethnic population 
as a mechanism to accommodate the demands of their ethnic groups as well as to protect their 
territorial integrity. Federal political systems are thus created to prevent, resolve or at least 
mitigate ethnically inspired or associated conflicts and in this way to ensure stability within 
the state. The tendency to use federal structures as a mechanism for the accommodation of 
ethnic diversity is far less visible on the African continent and this is despite the large ethnic 
diversity that characterizes the population of most African states. In Africa, nation and state 
building strategies aimed at weakening ethnic affinities in favour of a national identity 
prevail. They are based on the hope that, in this way, the attachment to the ethnic group will 
transform into an affinity for the state. However, many conflicts show that these strategies 
have not been successful in the slightest in erasing the ethnic identity of African citizens and 
guaranteeing the stability of the African state. It is therefore interesting to look at Ethiopia 
where the government has, for over 15 years now, chosen to base the development of national 
identity explicitly on the recognition of the ethnic diversity of the population: hence unity in 
diversity. For this purpose, an ethnic federal state has been established.  
 
Ethnic federalism – and Ethiopian federalism in particular – is hotly contested.2 The major 
argument against it is that ethnic federalism will only lead to further ethnic fragmentation, 
tensions and conflicts and will thus ultimately result in the demise of the state.3 The study of 
the Ethiopian case will however demonstrate that the political context at the time of adoption 
of ethnic federalism was such that a state building strategy based on the recognition and 
administrative/institutional accommodation of ethnic diversity was the only mechanism that 
could guarantee societal stability and the continued existence of the Ethiopian state. 
Moreover, it is submitted in this paper that Ethiopian federalism does have the capacity to 
effectively balance unity and diversity tendencies, but only if a number of constitutional/legal 
and political conditions are fulfilled. To substantiate the argument that there was really no 
viable alternative for what could be called ‘the ethnic strategy’, it is necessary to provide an 
insight into the background to the introduction of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia. This 
background will also enable us to better understand the form and practice of the Ethiopian 
federal model and to suggest pertinent improvements. The second section will thus focus on 
the historico-political developments leading to the development of an ethnic federal state as 
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from 1991. The third section will investigate whether a number of basic constitutional 
conditions necessary for the accommodative effect of federalism to come into play are 
fulfilled. Besides the constitutional provisions, attention will also be paid to the political 
context, which obviously influences the meaning of the constitutional provisions. The paper 
will conclude that, in addition to a number of constitutional changes, it is the commitment of 
the current rulers to the implementation of Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism that will be the main 
determinant of its success.  
 
2. Background to Ethnic Federalism 
 
2.1. The Origins of the ‘Ethnic Problem’4 
 
Ethiopian society is today characterized by a large diversity of languages, cultures, religions, 
socio-economic activities and governance traditions. Although the Ethiopian state has a 
particularly long history (there already existed an embryonic Ethiopian empire in the first 
century AD), this large societal diversity is of much more recent origin. It arose in the 
aftermath of a territorial expansion of the empire of Abyssinia at the end of the nineteenth 
century. It was Emperor Menelik who in the last decades of the nineteenth century 
considerably expanded the Abyssinian/Ethiopian heartland – strongly dominated by Orthodox 
Christians who used Amharic and Tigrigna as the most important languages – with territories 
in the south, east and west. This territorial expansion led to the traditionally dominant 
population groups no longer having a numerical dominance. The conquered peoples spoke 
dozens of languages, professed several religions (Islam and traditional religions) and had 
different socio-economic activities and governance structures. However, this diversity was not 
at all reflected in government policy. On the contrary, government policy aimed to transform 
this heterogeneous group into a homogeneous Ethiopian nation. The strategy used for this 
purpose did not include the creation of a new identity, but the propagation of an existing 
identity – the identity of the conqueror – as the national identity. Concretely, the regime 
strived to erase the ethnic identity of the non-Amhara peoples and to replace it with an 
Amhara identity. It was the Amhara elite (and in particular the elite from the central region of 
Shoa) which had assumed power after the accession of Emperor Menelik (in 1889). The 
dominant position of the Tigrayans had ended with the death of the Tigrayan Emperor 
Yohannes, the predecessor of Menelik. The Amhara language (Amharic), culture and religion 
(Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity) were strongly propagated and idealized and all other 
languages, cultures and religions were denigrated. Important instruments in this Amharisation 
policy were the imperial administration and education that exclusively used Amharic. Not 
only were the non-Amhara peoples the victims of an Amhara cultural and religious 
dominance, economically they were also in an inferior position. In many cases, the conquered 
peoples lost their traditional land rights for the benefit of the (Amhara) conqueror. Finally, the 
non-Amhara peoples were the victims of an Amhara political dominance. For non-Amhara the 
learning of Amharic and the adoption of Amhara culture, tradition and religion were 
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necessary steps to develop a career within the state. In the 1960s, a number of rebellions arose 
where the dissatisfaction with an Amhara dominated state was an important mobilizing factor. 
There was the independence struggle in Eritrea, which was more and more supported by the 
development of an Eritrean nationalism. Furthermore, there was the rebellion in the south-
eastern province of Bale where a Somali and a nascent Oromo nationalism could be observed.  
 
2.2. Marxism and the Discovery of the ‘Nationalities Issue’ 
 
2.2.1. The Ethiopian Student Movement 
 
The revolts in Bale and Eritrea contributed to a larger attention to ethnicity in Ethiopia. This 
was especially visible within the Ethiopian student movement. Initially, the Ethiopian student 
movement was a corporatist movement that defended typical student interests in the field of 
food, housing and other similar matters. In the course of the 1960s the movement developed a 
much wider social objective and it became one of the most important actors in the opposition 
against the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie. In the beginning, the Ethiopian student 
movement had a pan-Ethiopian character, but at the end of the 1960s, the movement adopted 
a critical attitude towards the unity claimed by the government, a unity that was supported, as 
indicated supra, by the dominance of Amhara identity. The rebel movements in Bale and 
Eritrea undoubtedly influenced the critical stance of the students, but the impact of Marxist-
Leninist ideas was also responsible. Marxist-Leninist ideas about the ‘nationalities issue’ were 
applied to Ethiopian society. Taking into account the above-described nation and state 
building strategy of the imperial regime, it is obvious that Marxist-Leninist literature on the 
national question had a particular relevance for Ethiopia. In his publication ‘Marxism and the 
National Question’ from 1913, Stalin recognized the right to self-determination of nations, 
which - according to him - implied: “that only the nation itself has the right to determine its 
destiny, that no one has the right forcibly to interfere in the life of the nation, to destroy its 
schools and other institutions, to violate its habits and customs, to repress its language, or 
curtail its rights.”5 Moreover, according to Stalin as well as Lenin, the right to self-
determination even included the right to secession. However, in their minds, the right to 
secession was conceived of more as a tactic and thus not seen as a real possibility. Lenin 
judged that granting the right to self-determination, including secession, would not actually 
stimulate, but rather prevent nations from invoking this right.6 In a dialectic way, it was thus 
used as a strategy to promote state unity. In any case, the national question was subordinate to 
the class struggle, which was unequivocally stated by Stalin in the following words: 
“Consequently, the fate of the Russian problem, and, accordingly, the "liberation" of the 
nations too, is bound up in Russia with the solution of the agrarian question, i.e., with the 
destruction of the relics of feudalism, i.e., with the democratization of the country. That 
explains why in Russia the national question is not an independent and decisive one, but a 
                                                 
5 J.V. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (1913), 
http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1913/03.htm (last visited 5 May 2009). 
6 Walker Connor, The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), p. 34. 
 4
part of the general and more important question of the emancipation of the country.”7 These 
ideas clearly influenced Ethiopian students when they discussed the ethnic issue in Ethiopia. 
In 1969, the student magazine Struggle published a number of articles, which tackled Amhara 
dominance over the other ethnic groups.8 Especially an article written by Wallelign 
Mekonnen has gained notoriety. In his article, Wallelign radically contested the official 
assimilation policy. He recognized the ethnic diversity of the Ethiopian population: “Ethiopia 
is not really one nation. It is made up of a dozen nationalities, with their own languages, ways 
of dressing, history, social organisation and territorial entity. And what else is a nation? Is it 
not made of a people with a particular tongue, particular ways of dressing, particular history, 
particular social and economic organisations? Then may I conclude that in Ethiopia there is 
the Oromo Nation, the Tigrai Nation, the Amhara Nation, the Gurage Nation, the Sidama 
Nation …”9 Therefore, he continued, a new state has to be built, a state in which “all 
nationalities participate equally in state affairs, where every nationality is given equal 
opportunity to preserve and develop its language, its music, its history, …a state where no 
nation dominates another nation be it economically or culturally.” He even accepted 
secession “As long as secession is led by the peasants and workers and believes in its 
internationalist obligation...” although the ultimate objective remained unity: “In the long 
run, Socialism is internationalism and a socialist movement will never remain secessionist for 
good.” When analyzing the current Ethiopian constitution in section 3, it will become clear 
that there are major similarities between these analyses of the Ethiopian students and the 
current state building strategy. In the constitution, ethnic diversity is also recognized and used 
as a founding element of state building. The constitution further confirms the approach of the 
students by granting a right to secession to Ethiopia’s ‘nations’. It is thus submitted that there 
is a direct link between the approach towards the ethnic issue adopted by the Ethiopian 
students at the end of the 1960s and the current state building strategy in Ethiopia, which is 
expressed in the constitution. How this link came into being will be discussed infra. 
 
2.2.2. Multi-Ethnic Marxist Parties 
 
The ideas of the students played an important role in undermining the legitimacy of the 
imperial regime. The imperial regime fell in the course of 1974 and a military committee 
(known as the Derg) filled the resulting power vacuum. Initially, the Derg did not have a clear 
ideology, but it faced strong pressure from various Marxist movements. These movements, 
which found their intellectual and ideological ammunition in radical student circles, 
demanded the resignation of the military and the formation of a civilian government.10 To 
weaken these critical voices and to acquire greater support from the people, the Derg became 
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increasingly radical.11 This radicalization resulted in the adoption of ‘Ethiopian socialism’ at 
the end of 1974 and by 1976, the Derg had adopted a clear Marxist-Leninist outlook. This 
was going to influence the approach of the Derg towards the ethnic issue, but before going 
into that, it is important to mention two movements that played a major role in the first years 
of the military regime: the EPRP (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party) and MAESON (the 
Amharic acronym of All Ethiopia Socialist Movement). Both parties had their roots in the 
Ethiopian student movement. Consequently, they both adopted the dominant ideology of the 
student movement, Marxism-Leninism, and they both defended the right to self-determination 
of the diverse Ethiopian peoples. However, they followed Lenin and Stalin as they argued that 
the struggle for self-determination was subordinate to the class struggle.12 Hence, according 
to them, a successful class struggle, and the socialist revolution that would follow from it, 
would also solve the ethnic problem. EPRP and MAESON opined that a successful class 
struggle would depend on the ‘broad masses’ being guided in their revolutionary struggle 
against the ‘exploiting classes’ by a ‘working-class vanguard party’. EPRP and MAESON 
both claimed to be that party, but in reality power was exercised by the military and the two 
multi-national Marxist-Leninist parties had to decide which attitude they would take towards 
it. The EPRP considered the military government unacceptable and the party demanded the 
immediate formation of a ‘Provisional People’s Government’.13 MAESON, on the other hand, 
choose to cooperate with the Derg, judging that the military government was a necessary 
phase on the road to a ‘people’s government’. The choice of the EPRP ushered in a violent 
conflict with the MAESON/Derg alliance (the so-called red terror), which led to nearly the 
total destruction of the EPRP by 1978. But the Derg, by then under the absolute control of 
Mengistu Haile Mariam, was not interested in power-sharing and decided to destroy its ally 
MAESON as well. Nonetheless, the initial cooperation with MAESON enabled the Derg to 
adopt and refine a Marxist-Leninist ideology.14 This obliged the Derg to take a stance on the 
‘nationalities issue’ as well. This stance is clearly expressed in the ‘Programme of the 
National Democratic Revolution’ from 1976. It is interesting to cite the relevant provisions, 
for they again show clear resemblances with the current state building strategy:  
                                                
 
“The right to self-determination of all nationalities will be recognized and fully respected. No 
nationality will dominate another one since the history, culture, language and religion of 
each nationality will have equal recognition in accordance with the spirit of socialism. The 
unity of Ethiopia’s nationalities will be based on their common struggle against feudalism, 
imperialism, bureaucratic capitalism and all reactionary forces… 
 
 
11 Edmond J. Keller, Revolutionary Ethiopia – From Empire to People’s Republic (Bloomington/Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 192. 
12 J. Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia – The Tigray People’s Liberation Front, 1975 – 1991 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 59-60; Leenco Lata, The Ethiopian State at the Crossroads – 
Decolonization and Democratization or Disintegration? (Lawrenceville/Asmara, The Red Sea Press, 1999), p. 
199. 
13 Young, p. 59. 
14 Ghelawdewos Araia, Ethiopia – The Political Economy of Transition (Lanham: University Press of America, 
1995), p. 134. 
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Given Ethiopia’s existing situation, the problem of nationalities can be resolved if each 
nationality is accorded full right to self-government. This means that each nationality will 
have regional autonomy to decide on matters concerning its internal affairs. Within its 
environs, it has the right to determine the contents of its political, economic and social life, 
use its own language and elect its own leaders and administrators to head its own organ.”15 
 
Hence, in order to achieve unity, diversity had to be recognized. All nationalities had a right 
to self-determination, which included language rights and the right to regional autonomy. As 
will become clear infra, this right to self-determination resembles the right to self-
determination granted in the current constitution. However, it is notable that in the Derg 
document no right to secession is granted - the conformity with the Leninist and Stalinist 
views on the right to self-determination nevertheless being guaranteed by using the term 
‘nationalities’ instead of ‘nations’.16 This approach rested on a traditional differentiation 
between ‘nations’, which had a right to secession, and ‘nationalities’, which had not.17 In any 
case, for the Derg, as for the EPRP and MAESON, national/ethnic antagonisms were 
subordinate to class antagonisms. The Derg thus thought that getting rid of class antagonisms 
(which was an objective of government policy) would solve the ethnic problem. In practice, 
this led to a continuation of Amhara dominance. As a result, the Derg came under increasing 
pressure from regional and ethnic rebellion movements, which will be discussed next. 
 
2.2.3. Ethnic Fronts 
 
After the elimination of the EPRP as power factor, the most important resistance against the 
Derg (important as to the degree of danger they posed for the Derg’s rule) came from 
movements that were focused on a certain region or ethnic group. The reference to regional 
liberation movements is related to the leading resistance movement in Eritrea, the EPLF (the 
Eritrean People’s Liberation Front). The EPLF fought for the right to self-determination 
(more specifically independence) of the Eritreans, as such taking a special position among the 
Ethiopian resistance movements. Eritrean identity was not an ethnic identity, but a regional 
identity, an identity shared by the different endogenous peoples of Eritrea. The other 
resistance movements were ethnic movements, movements that struggled for the interests of a 
particular ethnic group, such as the Oromo and Somali. The Ethiopian resistance movement 
that played the decisive role in the ultimate fall of the Derg was the TPLF (Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front). The TPLF was established in 1975 by students who were strongly 
influenced by the Ethiopian student movement and thus by Marxist-Leninist ideas, including 
these about the ‘nationalities issue’. The TPLF however differed from the other Marxist-
Leninist movements such as the Derg, MAESON and EPRP, by the emphasis it placed on the 
ethnic element. For the TPLF, national/ethnic antagonisms were a primordial concern and it 
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presented itself as a movement fighting for the right to self-determination of the Tigrayans.18 
This seems to indicate that the TPLF deviated from the ideas held by Lenin and Stalin that the 
grant of a right to self-determination was merely a tactic, a formal proviso in order to achieve 
state unity or, in other words, that the national struggle was subordinate to the class struggle. 
Note that the latter vision was also held by the movements discussed in section 2.2.2 supra. 
By placing such an emphasis on ethnic rights, it can be argued that the TPLF’s approach 
rather corresponded with the ideas of the so-called Austro-Marxists, Karl Renner and Otto 
Bauer. According to Renner and Bauer, nationalism was not a transitory phenomenon that 
would disappear after a successful class struggle and the establishment of a socialist state.19 
On the contrary, they opined that the latter processes would only strengthen national 
identities.20 Of course, it cannot be stated with certainty whether the TPLF considered the 
right to self-determination as a genuine principle or rather as a tactic on the road to greater 
cohesion in the Ethiopian state.21 However, the primary focus on the right to self-
determination, including the right to secession, of the Tigrayans, seems to point to the former 
interpretation. That Tigrayan nationalism was an important inspirational factor behind the 
TPLF’s struggle is reflected in the TPLF manifesto from 1976 which stated: “The first task of 
this national struggle will be the establishment of an independent republic of Tigray.” Soon, 
this manifesto was repudiated by the TPLF, although the front has never completely rejected 
the possibility of secession. This was motivated as follows: “If there is a democratic 
atmosphere than self-determination means the creation of voluntary integrated nations and 
nationalities whose relations are based on equality and mutual advantages. However, if the 
present oppression and exploitation continues or intensifies it means the creation of an 
independent and People’s democratic republic of Tigray.”22 In the course of the liberation 
struggle, the TPLF decided to widen its objectives and to extend its actions to areas outside 
Tigray, in order to bring about the complete downfall of the Derg. The TPLF, however, only 
represented a small part of the Ethiopian population (the Tigrayans) and, to rally other peoples 
behind its struggle, the TPLF in 1989 created the EPRDF. With the creation of the EPRDF, 
the TPLF’s aim was the formation of a broad coalition of ethnically based parties. This 
political strategy was entirely consistent with the emphasis that was placed by the TPLF on 
the ethnic element. After the fall of the Derg in 1991, a transitional regime in which the 
EPRDF and other movements organized on an ethnic basis played a central role was installed. 
It was the beginning of a totally new attitude of the Ethiopian state towards the ethnic 
problem.  
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3. Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia 
 
3.1. The Road to Federalism23 
 
A national conference with a broad representation of predominantly ethnically based 
movements laid the foundations of the transitional period. The transitional period would be 
concluded with the coming into force of a new constitution. The foundations of the 
transitional period (e.g. the governance and policy guidelines, the structure and composition 
of the transitional institutions) were laid in the Transitional Period Charter, in fact a 
constitution for the transitional period. Several provisions of the Charter reflected a special 
attention to the ethnic problem. The Charter, which was published on 22 July 1991 in the 
Negarit Gazeta (official journal of Ethiopia), granted, besides universal rights, far-reaching 
ethnic rights to all the ethnic groups of Ethiopia. The dominance of ethnic-based 
organizations in the transitional conference was such that the grant of extensive ethnic rights 
was a necessary condition for the success of the conference and thus for the continued 
existence of Ethiopia. The Charter aimed to realize a beginning of implementation of these 
ethnic rights by providing for a guaranteed ethnic representation in legislative and executive 
institutions of government and by announcing the establishment of regional and local 
administrations on an ethnic basis. The government was initially – just like the national 
conference – relatively politically inclusive with a representation of several political 
organizations. However, the transitional government was soon dominated by the EPRDF. The 
elections of June 1992 reinforced EPRDF dominance, in the central government as well as in 
the regional governments that had been created by Proclamation No. 7/1992. This was the 
political context within which the constitutional process took place. The new constitution, 
which was approved by a constituent assembly on 8 December 1994, was therefore the result 
of an EPRDF-controlled process. However, it would be an exaggeration to infer that the 
constitution is merely a reflection of the EPRDF programme. In particular, the foundations of 
the ethnic federation were already included in the Transitional Charter that enjoyed a broad 
societal support in July 1991.  
 
3.2. Ethnic Federalism: Constitutional and Political Assessment 
 
3.2.1. Nations, Nationalities and Peoples as Bearers of Sovereign Power 
 
The legal groundwork for ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is laid by the federal constitution of 
which the preamble already indicates the new nation and state building strategy. This strategy 
focuses on two elements: protecting the rights of ethic groups and ensuring the unity of the 
Ethiopian state, hence: unity in diversity. These two elements are stressed throughout the 
preamble, but it suffices in this regard to cite the first and second paragraphs: “We, the 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia (the constitution thus adopts Marxist-Leninist 
terminology to indicate the various ethnic groups) Strongly committed, in full and free 
exercise of our right to self-determination, to building a political community founded on the 
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rule of law and capable of ensuring a lasting peace, guaranteeing a democratic order, and 
advancing our economic and social development” (my emphasis). The preamble ends by 
stating that it is the nations, nationalities and peoples that have adopted the constitution. It is 
therefore no surprise that in its Article 8, the constitution grants all sovereign power to these 
nations, nationalities and peoples. From here it follows that “Every Nation, Nationality and 
People in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, including the right to 
secession.”24 The grant of sovereign power, which includes the right to self-determination up 
to secession, is clearly inspired by the views of Lenin and Stalin as expressed in the latter’s 
‘Marxism and the National Question’ from 1913.25 In that publication Stalin calls nations 
sovereign and grants them the right to self-determination, including secession.26 Obviously, 
the right to self-determination is not only a Marxist-Leninist concept, it is also a right 
included in international treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The right to 
self-determination of nations, nationalities and peoples as conceived by Article 39 of the 
Ethiopian constitution, comprises four components: it comprises the right to speak, to write 
and to develop its own language; to express, to develop and to promote its own culture; and to 
preserve its history (1); it includes the right to a full measure of self-government, which is 
composed of two elements: the right to establish institutions of government in the territory 
that it inhabits (2) and the right to equitable representation in state and federal governments 
(3). Finally, as said, the right to self-determination includes the right to secession (4). It is 
submitted here that these four components correspond with the most progressive views on 
minority protection in international law. It is striking that provisions inspired by Marxism-
Leninism fit in perfectly with recent tendencies in international law. After the Second World 
War - with its nationalist excesses - there was a general reluctance to grant specific rights to 
ethnic minorities. International law focused on universal (individual) rights and judged that 
the protection of these rights guaranteed the protection of ethnic minorities as well. Many 
African countries used this opinion to legitimize their nation building strategies. It became 
however clear that the effective protection of ethnic minorities required more than a mere 
protection of universal rights; it moreover required states to adopt specific minority rights as 
well. Consequently, despite its focus on universal rights, international law relatively early 
paid attention to the rights of ethnic minorities. In that context, Article 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political rights states: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or 
linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, 
in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.” International law thus grants 
ethnic minorities language rights and cultural rights; the same rights are incorporated in the 
first component of the Ethiopian right to self-determination. The third component, the right of 
ethnic groups to be represented in state and federal governments, corresponds with the 
participation rights included in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities from 1992. Articles 2.2 and 2.3 of this 
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Declaration stipulate: “Persons belonging to minorities have the right to participate 
effectively in cultural, religious, social, economic and public life. Persons belonging to 
minorities have the right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where 
appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in 
which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation.” The second 
component of the Ethiopian right to self-determination, i.e. the right to territorial autonomy, is 
not granted in international law, except in the specific case of indigenous peoples. However, it 
is argued that the right to autonomy of ethnic minorities can be based on the right to self-
determination, which is - as already stated - included in several international covenants.  
Because of its initial application in the context of decolonization, the right to self-
determination was for a long time associated with the right to secession. However, today the 
dominant view in legal doctrine gives a wider meaning to self-determination. According to 
this vision, the right to self-determination has an internal as well as an external component 
and secession is part of the external component.27 The internal component is often associated 
with autonomy or self-government.28 The right to secession as included in Article 39 goes 
even further than the progressive interpretation of international law. The prevailing view in 
legal doctrine is that the right to secede can only be applied in particular circumstances, as 
ultimum remedium.29 However, as follows from the clear provisions of Article 39(1), the right 
to secession in Ethiopia is unconditional. In doing so, the constitution deviates from the 
Transitional Period Charter, the interim constitution adopted by the new power holders after 
assuming power in 1991. Article 2(c) of the Charter granted a conditional right to secession. 
This right could only be exercised when the nations, nationalities and peoples were prevented 
from exercising the other aspects of their right to self-determination. Furthermore, in the draft 
constitution, approved in May 1994, two alternatives were formulated with regard to the right 
to secession. The majority opinion supported an unconditional right to secession, whereas a 
minority opinion was in favour of a conditional right. Ultimately, the constituent assembly 
followed the opinion of the majority. This seems to indicate that the Ethiopian constitutional 
drafter was serious about the right to secession, an impression that is further confirmed by 
Article 39(4). Yes, it is true that the Soviet constitution of 1977 also granted a right to 
secession,30 but this was just form: there was no intention to actually uphold the right.31 
Article 39(4) however provides for a procedure to exercise the right to secession and such a 
procedure was not included in the USSR constitution. Hence, the protection of ethnic rights 
takes such a central position in the Ethiopian constitution that it is difficult to consider the 
corresponding constitutional provisions as mere ritualistic Marxist formulae. Since a 
fundamental place is given to nations, nationalities and peoples, it is of course important to 
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diversity: a regained interest in the right of self-determination,’ Journal of African law, Vol. 44 (2000), 22.  
28 Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘On the Legal Understanding of Autonomy,’ in Markku Suksi (ed.), Autonomy: 
Applications and Implications (The Hague/ London/ Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1998), p. 9. 
29 Stefaan Smis, ‘Ethiopia and the Right to Secession in International and Comparative Law,’ in Eva Brems and 
Christophe Van der Beken (eds.), Federalism and the Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia (Münster: Lit 
Verlag, 2008), p. 118. 
30 Article 72 of the Soviet Constitution stipulated that each of the 15 union republics had a right to secede from 
the USSR. 
31 Connor, pp. 51-52. 
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know who these are. Who are the bearers of the right to self-determination? The answer is 
given in Article 39(5) that, remarkably, does not differentiate between ‘nations, nationalities 
and peoples’ and defines these three terms as “a group of people who have or share large 
measure of a common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a 
common or related identities, a common psychological make-up and who inhabit an 
identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.” For this definition, the drafters of the 
constitution have again benefited from the work of Stalin. In his publication ‘nationalism and 
the Marxist question’ Stalin gives the following definition of ‘nations’: A nation is a 
historically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of a common 
language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a common 
culture. The dominance of ethnic-based parties in the constitutional drafting process has led to 
a constitutional focus on the rights of the Ethiopian ethnic groups. Because of their Marxist 
backgrounds, the constitutional drafters have couched these rights in Marxist-Leninist terms. 
Nonetheless, irrespective of its Marxist inspiration, Article 39 grants extensive rights to 
Ethiopia’s ethnic groups and, by doing so, it fits in with an international trend towards 
increasing protection of ethnic minorities. Moreover, the rights are so extensive that, despite 
the Marxist phraseology, the constitutional drafter seems genuinely committed to their 
implementation. This impression corresponds with what has been argued in section 2.2.3., 
namely that from its establishment the TPLF gave a primordial importance to ethnicity, rather 
than subordinating it to class. A similar picture arises from the constitutional provisions that 
construct the Ethiopian federal state structure, which will be discussed in the next section. 
 
3.2.2. Ethnic Federalism: Unity in Diversity 
 
Since the confines of this paper do not allow a complete overview of the constitutional 
provisions framing Ethiopian federalism, the paper rather focuses on a number of 
constitutional aspects that – according to this author -  are determinants for the achievement of 
unity in diversity in the federation, and thus for the effectiveness of Ethiopian federalism as a 
state building strategy. However, as already indicated in the introduction, the impact of 
constitutional provisions is not only determined by their intrinsic features, but also by the 
political context in which they operate. The analysis of the political context will not be treated 
separately, but will be interwoven with the assessment of the constitutional provisions, so as 
to provide a pertinent insight into their meaning.   
 
It was already mentioned that the Ethiopian population is ethnically very diverse with - 
according to official figures - more than 80 ethnic groups. As indicated in section 3.2.1, the 
Ethiopian constitution grants all of these groups a right to territorial autonomy, implying that 
all ethnic groups can be linked to a particular territory. Because it is this mindset that has 
determined the constitutional construction of Ethiopian federalism, the latter is commonly 
designated as ethnic federalism. The ambition to realize an overlap between ethnic and 
territorial borders has clearly played a role when determining the regional states of the 
federation; Article 46 of the constitution makes this explicit by stating “States shall be 
delimited on the basis of the settlement patterns, language, identity and consent of the peoples 
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concerned.” Article 47(1) provides for nine regional states or regions. These are the state of 
Tigray, the state of Afar, the state of Amhara, the state of Oromia, the state of Somalia, the 
state of Benishangul/Gumuz, the state of the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
(hereafter the Southern state), the state of the Gambela peoples and the state of the Harari 
people. The names of the regions already reveal some information on their ethnic 
composition. In the first instance, six of the nine regional states carry names that refer to the 
ethnic groups that have a dominant position in the respective states. This means that the 
Tigray ethnic group is dominant in the Tigray state, the Afar in Afar, the Amhara in Amhara, 
the Oromo in Oromia, the Somali in Somalia and the Harari in Harar. In the first five of these 
regions, the dominant position of the ‘nominal’ ethnic group implies a political as well as a 
numerical dominance. The five ethnic groups control the political institutions of ‘their’ 
regions in which they also constitute a large numerical majority. The Harar state is a special 
case, since, although the Harari ethnic group controls the regional political institutions, the 
Harari are a small numerical minority in the region (they constitute a mere 8.65% of the 
regional population).32 The name Benishangul/Gumuz refers to the two major endogenous (I 
will come back to this term infra) ethnic groups of this region: the Berta (or Benishangul) and 
the Gumuz. The names of the remaining two regions indicate that various ethnic groups are 
living there. Taking into account the presence of more than 80 ethnic groups in Ethiopia, the 
above obviously demonstrates that most ethnic groups do not have their own regional state, 
but are a minority in one of the regional states. Hence, unity in diversity must not only be 
realized at the federal level (i.e. in the relationship between the federal state and the regions), 
but also at the regional level (i.e. the relationship between the regional state and the diverse 
intra-regional ethnic groups). Whether the Ethiopian model of federalism is suited to achieve 
this constitutional objective will be evaluated in the next paragraphs, which will also include 
implicit or explicit suggestions for improvement. 
 
1. Unity in Diversity at the Federal Level 
 
In order to assess the capacity of the Ethiopian federal model to achieve unity in diversity at 
the federal level, this section will focus on the autonomy of the regions as well as on their 
political participation at the federal level. It is submitted that genuine regional autonomy and 
an effective political participation of the regions at the federal level are necessary conditions 
for the accommodative effects of ethnic federalism to come into play.  
 
The study of the constitutional allocation of competences over the federal and regional 
governments does not provide an unequivocal answer to the question whether the Ethiopian 
regional states have sufficient competences. A rather mixed impression arises. On the one 
hand, the power of the regional states to take policy decisions in a number of fields such as 
education, health care and social and economic development seems limited by the power of 
the federal government to draw federal policy lines.33 On the other hand, the regional states 
                                                 
32 Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Population Census Commission, The 2007 Population and Housing 
Census, December 2008, Addis Ababa. 
33 Article 51(2) + (3) federal constitution. 
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have wide competences to form their own territorial, administrative and institutional 
organizations. The regions have the power to enact their own constitution, to set up a police 
force and they themselves determine the organization of the local administration.34 The 
regional states also have important, especially in the light of the specific politico-historical 
context, powers in the field of language. Article 5(3) of the federal constitution grants the 
regional states the power to choose their own working language. Nevertheless Article 5(2) 
provides that Amharic will continue to be the working language of the federal government. 
This constitutional provision has not remained theoretical. Today, the six regions, which are 
dominated by one particular ethnic group (see supra), have adopted the language of the 
concerned group as the regional working language.35 The three other multi-ethnic regions 
(Gambella, Benishangul/Gumuz and the Southern region) – and of course the Amhara region 
– have opted for a continued use of Amharic. An important protection of regional autonomy is 
that the federal government cannot unilaterally withdraw the powers of the regional states. A 
distinctive characteristic of federations is that the powers of the federated entities are included 
in the constitution and that the constitution cannot be modified without the participation of the 
regional states. Ethiopia is no exception to this. However, the Ethiopian federal government 
does have the power to intervene in regional affairs. Since the federal intervention is 
dependent on strict conditions, this should not be seen as an unacceptable limitation of 
regional autonomy. The Ethiopian legislator seems to have found an acceptable balance 
between protecting the autonomy of the regional states and the duty of the federal government 
to guarantee internal peace and security and the protection of the constitutional order. Finally, 
the autonomy of the regional states is determined by the degree of financial autonomy. 
Complete financial autonomy comes about only when the regional states can generate enough 
revenue to pay for their expenditure. The study of fiscal federalism in Ethiopia shows that the 
fiscal powers which have been assigned to the regions, do not generate sufficient income. The 
result is that the own revenue of the regions does not at all suffice to cover regional 
expenditure. The discrepancy between regional revenue and expenditure is primarily removed 
with subsidies from the federal government.36 For their expenditure, all regional states are 
therefore strongly dependent on the federal government. This provides the federal government 
with an important mechanism to control the regions and is thus not favourable for an 
autonomous exercise of the regional powers.  
 
Whereas the constitution offers a rather mixed picture as far as regional autonomy is 
concerned, the prevalent political situation is clearly not in the interest of regional autonomy. 
This is due to the position and internal operation of the EPRDF, which has been the leading 
political organization in Ethiopia since 1991. The EPRDF is a coalition of four ethnic-based 
parties: the TPLF, the ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement), the OPDO (Oromo 
People’s Democratic Organization) and the SEPDM (South Ethiopian Peoples Democratic 
                                                 
34 Article 52(b) + (g) federal constitution. 
35 These languages are Tigrigna in Tigray, Oromiffa in Oromia, Somaligna in Somali and Afarigna in Afar. In 
Harar besides the language of the politically dominant group, the Harari, the language of the numerically 
dominant group, Oromiffa, has also been adopted as the regional working language. 
36 Solomon Negussie Abesha, Fiscal Federalism in the Ethiopian Ethnic-based Federal System (Utrecht: 
Universiteit Utrecht, PhD Thesis, 2006). 
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Movement). As their names indicate, the first three parties were established to represent one 
specific ethnic group each, namely the Tigrayans, Amhara and Oromo respectively. The 
SEPDM is a party established for the diverse ethnic groups of the multi-ethnic Southern 
region. Since, as indicated supra, regional borders are conceived to correspond with ethnic 
borders, the EPRDF in practice disposes of a specific party for four of the regional states: 
Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and the Southern regional state. In the regional and federal 
parliamentary elections of 1995 and 2000 the four EPRDF parties gained more than 90 per 
cent of the seats in the regional parliaments of these four regions. In the (first chamber of the) 
federal parliament, the four parties combined also held a large majority of seats. Moreover, 
EPRDF dominance over the federal and regional levels of the federation is even larger due to 
the front’s control of the ruling parties in the remaining five regional states. In the remaining 
five regions, the regional political institutions are dominated by parties that are not formal 
EPRDF members, but have been established and are supervised by the EPRDF.37 The most 
recent regional and federal elections of May 2005 have confirmed EPRDF dominance, albeit 
that the federal parliament and most regional parliaments are now characterized by a certain 
level of political pluralism.38 Since both the federal and the regional levels have parliamentary 
systems, with executive institutions dependent on a federal or regional parliamentary 
majority, all executive institutions are also dominated by EPRDF constituent or affiliated 
parties. For example, 19 of the 21 federal ministers (without the prime minister) are EPRDF 
members.39 The remaining two ministers are members of EPRDF affiliated parties. The 
control of the same party over the federal and regional political institutions does not 
automatically imply a limitation of regional autonomy. On the contrary, the fact that the 
EPRDF is organized on an ethnic basis seems prima facie favourable for an autonomous 
exercise of regional powers. However, the restrictions to regional autonomy are a result of the 
centralized decision-making process of the EPRDF. The different ethnically based parties – 
and thus the regional governments that are controlled by them – have to follow the central 
EPRDF programme when exercising their powers.40 In the statute of the EPRDF this is stated 
as follows: “EPRDF actions will be implemented in all the regions by the national member 
organizations: A. National EPRDF programmes, decisions, as well as tasks will be made 
effective by member national organizations in their respective region. B. National member 
organizations should implement national decisions and basic implementation directives in 
their regions. However, they are free to modify the national decisions and implementation 
directives according to conditions in their respective regions.” The regional states can thus 
administer themselves, but they have to do this within the framework established by the 
EPRDF. The ruling parties of the five non-EPRDF regional states also follow the EPRDF 
programme, as they have once again explicitly stated after the latest EPRDF congress in 
September 2008. The following declaration of the ANDP (Afar National Democratic Party), 
                                                 
37 Van der Beken, pp. 42-44. 
38 The election results can be found on the website of the National Electoral Board of Ethiopia: 
http://www.electionsethiopia.org/Index.html (last visited 5 May 2009). 
39 This observation is deduced from information provided by: Walta Information Center, 31 October 2008; the 
EPRDF website http://www.eprdf.org.et/ and http://www.infoplease.com/world/leaders/ethiopia.html (last 
visited 5 May 2009). 
40 Assefa Fiseha, Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia (Nijmegen: Wolf legal Publishers, 
2005/2006), pp. 379-380. 
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the ruling party in the Afar regional state, is illustrative in this regard: “The Afar National 
Democratic Party representative indicated the commitment of the Afar people to implement 
the strategies and policies of EPRDF and its allies to eradicate poverty and thereby improve 
the living standards of the public.”41 The implementation of the EPRDF programme at federal 
and regional levels is furthermore facilitated by the strong links between party and 
government institutions. The chairman and vice-chairman of the EPRDF are respectively 
prime minister and deputy prime minister in the federal government. More than half of the 
other federal ministers are members of the EPRDF executive committee. The presidents of the 
four EPRDF regional states are also members of the executive committee. 
 
At this point, it is important to recapitulate the Marxist-Leninist roots of the EPRDF. The 
ideas of the EPRDF about the ethnic issue were inspired by Marxism-Leninism and it is thus 
no surprise that the mechanism included in the Ethiopian constitution to tackle this issue is 
ethnic federalism - the mechanism that was also used in Soviet constitutions. The Soviet 
constitution of 1977, for instance, created a federal structure of which the 15 union republics 
were ethnic-based.42 It has to be remembered that these union republics were sovereign and 
were granted the right to secede.43 However, in practice the autonomy of the union republics 
was severely hampered by the operation of the centralized communist party that controlled all 
union republics.44 The practical operation of federalism in the Soviet Union thus strongly 
resembles federalism as currently practised in Ethiopia. The ultimate disintegration of the 
Soviet Union has demonstrated that a nation building strategy based on the formal grant, but 
practical limitation of self-government, is not suited to achieve unity in diversity. The 
constitutional focus on ethnic rights does not lead to a reduction of ethnic identification 
(which is the traditional Marxist-Leninist view), but rather reinforces it. Restricting ethnic 
rights in practice will thus only lead to an increased conflict potential. Consequently, the 
dominance of the EPRDF appears to be an important impediment to the success of ethnic 
federalism as a state building strategy in Ethiopia. This argument is further strengthened by 
the observation that the provisions of the Ethiopian constitution place more emphasis on the 
protection of ethnic rights than the Soviet constitution of 1977. Hence, in Ethiopia there is an 
even stronger contradiction between form and reality. Contrary to the Soviet constitution, the 
Ethiopian constitution does not grant sovereign power to the regions, but to the ethnic groups 
themselves. Consequently, it is not the regions, but the nations, nationalities and peoples that 
have a right to secede. In the Soviet constitution, on the other hand, the right to secession was 
granted to the 15 union republics, not to the various ethnic groups inside these republics. 
Furthermore, as mentioned supra, the Ethiopian constitution even provides for a procedure to 
exercise the right to secession. Consequently, the Ethiopian ethnic groups, which are 
sovereign and possess extensive rights, have to accept strong limits to their autonomy in 
                                                 
41 Walta Information Center, 16 September 2008. 
42 Connor, p. 51; Christopher Clapham, ‘Afterword,’ in David Turton (ed.), Ethnic Federalism – The Ethiopian 
Experience in Comparative Perspective (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), p. 237; Bill Bowring, ‘Burial and 
resurrection – Karl Renner’s controversial influence on the ‘national question’ in Russia,’ in Ephraim Nimni 
(ed.), National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics (London/New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 198. 
43 Respectively Articles 76 and 72 of the 1977 USSR constitution.  
44 Gary N. Wilson, ‘Russia,’ in Ann L. Griffiths and Karl Nerenberg (eds.), Handbook of Federal Countries, 
2002 (Montreal & Kingston/London/Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), p. 254. 
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practice. This means, for instance, that today it is politically impossible for an ethnic group to 
exercise the right to secession. The constitution requires that the demand for secession is 
approved by the members of the legislative council of the concerned nation, nationality or 
people. Today, all legislative councils, at the regional and sub-regional level (see infra), are 
controlled by the EPRDF, which is certainly not in favour of secession, notwithstanding its 
constitutional incorporation. The latter point can for instance be illustrated by the strong 
resistance of the EPRDF against armed opposition movements that express secessionist ideas, 
such as the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) or ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front). 
 
The achievement of unity requires not only genuine regional autonomy; it also requires that 
the regional states be prepared to cooperate in order to develop a stable Ethiopian state. An 
important instrument in this regard is the political participation of the diverse regional 
states/ethnic groups (or federated entities) at the federal level.45 The theory is that federated 
entities are only interested in the unity of the federation when they can exert sufficient 
influence in the federal institutions.46 The Ethiopian constitution contains only limited 
provisions in this regard. For instance, the constitution says nothing about the ethnic identity 
of members of the executive. In practice, as has already been indicated supra, the executive is 
dominated by the four EPRDF regional states. Not less than 19 of the 21 ministers (excluding 
the Prime Minister, who is from Tigray) are from these regional states.47 The remaining two 
ministers are from Afar and Somali; Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella have no federal 
ministers. The guaranteed representation of all regional states is limited to the parliament. As 
is customary in federations, the federal parliament of Ethiopia consists of two chambers: the 
House of People’s Representatives (HoPR) and the House of the Federation (HoF). The 
members of the first chamber, the HoPR, are elected by universal and direct elections by 
means of the plurality system.48 This electoral system results in the larger (more densely 
populated) states having much more representatives in the HoPR than the smaller ones. 
Together, the Amhara and Oromia regions have more than half of the seats. Because of its 
specific composition the HoF offers no counterweight for the preponderance of the large 
regional states in the first chamber. Article 61(2) of the federal constitution stipulates that all 
nations, nationalities and peoples have a right to at least one representative in the HoF. Article 
61(2) adds that the nations, nationalities and peoples have a right to one additional 
representative for each one million of their population. These representatives are elected from 
the states – in practice by the regional parliaments.49 In concrete terms, this means that 
regional states that have an ethnically very diverse population (such as the Southern state) or 
                                                 
45 Ronald L. Watts, ‘Lessons from the pathology of multicultural federations,’ in Peter Hänni (ed.), L’homme et 
l’état – Mélanges offerts par la Faculté de droit de l’Université de Fribourg pour Thomas Fleiner (Fribourg: 
Editions Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 2003), p. 234. 
46 John McGarry, ‘Federal Political Systems and the Accommodation of National Minorities,’ in Ann L. 
Griffiths and Karl Nerenberg (eds.), Handbook of Federal Countries, 2002 (Montreal & Kingston/London/Ithaca: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), p. 437. 
47 OPDO and ANDM have six ministers each, SEPDM five and TPLF two. This observation is deduced from 
information provided on the EPRDF website: http://www.eprdf.org.et/ 
48 Article 54(1) + (2) of the federal constitution.  
49 Article 61(3) of the federal constitution; interview conducted by the author with Samuel Alemayehu, former 
Secretary General of the House of the Federation, Addis Ababa, September 2003. 
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that are inhabited by large ethnic groups (such as the Amhara and Oromia regions) are more 
strongly represented in the HoF. Hence, three states (the Southern state, Amhara and Oromia) 
together have 90 of the 112 representatives in the House of the Federation. However, one 
should not conclude from the above that the federal level is dominated by these three regional 
states. The dominance of the EPRDF in the executive and in the first chamber - as mentioned 
supra – as well as in the second chamber (the members of the HoF are all elected by EPRDF 
dominated regional councils) would make it more correct to describe the situation as an 
EPRDF dominance (which also includes an important role for Tigray, through the TPLF). 
Hence, once again, the political context prevents a full operation of the constitutional 
provisions; content does not reflect form.50 Content does reflect form, however, when it 
comes to the political participation of the non-EPRDF states. Together these five regional 
states account for 45 seats in the HoPR, 16 seats in the HoF and they only have two federal 
ministers. This weak position is not compensated for by the political context since, as 
discussed, the ruling parties in these regions are not members of the EPRDF. 
 
2. Unity in Diversity at the Regional Level 
 
Although an ethnic federation aims to achieve a correspondence between ethnic borders and 
regional borders, it is obvious that in practice a perfect overlap is never possible. This is 
particularly so in Ethiopia with its long tradition of internal migration and resettlement of 
ethnic groups. Supra, we have already mentioned that only six of Ethiopia’s nine regional 
states are dominated by a particular group. Six states are thus ethnic states, which provide a 
forum for the nominal ethnic groups to exercise the different aspects of their right to self-
determination, as included in Article 39. This means that the large majority of Ethiopia’s 80+ 
ethnic groups does not dominate a particular state, but rather constitutes a minority in one of 
the six ethnic states or in the three remaining multi-ethnic states. In this paper, the term ethnic 
minority is thus used for ethnic groups that do not dominate the regional state where they live. 
Consequently, members of the six ‘nominal’ ethnic groups who live outside ‘their’ regional 
state (e.g. Amhara living in the Oromia region) are also considered ethnic minorities. This 
shows that all regional states, even the six so-called ethnic ones, have ethnic minorities. 
Hence, the success of Ethiopian federalism must also be measured by its achievement of unity 
in diversity at the regional level, which will depend on the ethnic minorities being able to 
protect their rights. The latter issue will be studied in this section.  
 
For the ethnic groups that do not have their own region yet, the current nine regions of the 
federation form the framework through which they have to exercise their rights. However, this 
should not cause one to lose sight of the fact that the federal constitution offers these ethnic 
groups two possibilities of creating their own territorial entity, inside or outside the federation. 
It can be repeated that, according to Article 39 of the constitution, all nations, nationalities 
and peoples have a right to secede from the federation. Additionally, Article 47 states that all 
nations, nationalities and peoples, which do not have their own region yet, have the right to 
establish their own region. But, as pointed out supra, the political context is not exactly 
                                                 
50 I owe this terminology to Walker Connor. 
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favourable to the exercise of the right to secession. Neither is it favourable to the creation of 
new regional states. For instance, when the Sidama (an ethnic group in the Southern region) 
requested the establishment of their own regional state, this was rejected by the EPRDF.51 
The ruling party equally resisted a similar request from the Berta (one of the ethnic groups 
living in Benishangul-Gumuz), fearing that accepting this request would cause similar 
demands from other ethnic groups.52 Thus, again we see that the EPRDF is not willing to 
accept the full consequences of the constitution’s emphasis on ethnic rights. It is argued that 
today the EPRDF shares the Leninist view that sees the grant of a right to self-determination 
as a strategy to achieve unity rather than as an end in itself.53 The following statement by 
Meles Zenawi, prime minister and chairman of the EPRDF, seems to corroborate this: “There 
is no way the secession could take place one fine morning simply because the right is 
embodied in the constitution. As a matter of fact, the secession clause was put into the 
constitution in order to avoid such an eventuality.”54 Moreover, a few years ago, there were 
strong indications that the EPRDF was in the process of being reformed from a coalition of 
four ethnic-based parties to a single political party with four regional branches.55 As a matter 
of fact the SEPDF (the South Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Front), the ruling party of the 
Southern state, previously a coalition of 20 ethnic-based parties, merged into a single political 
party in September 2003: the SEPDM. This is not to say that constitutional provisions 
granting all ethnic groups a right to secede or a right to their own region are wise, but these 
are a consequence of the constitution not differentiating between the three categories of 
nations, nationalities and peoples. The argument would therefore be that the EPRDF should 
accept the implementation of the ethnic group rights included in the constitution, but the 
constitution should be revised in such a way that different rights are bestowed upon the three 
categories of nations, nationalities and peoples. In concrete terms, this could mean that the 
right to secede and the right to create a separate region are limited to particular ethnic 
roups.56 
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To improve unity in diversity inside the regions, a number of constitutional revisions seem 
also to be necessary. To implement the right to self-determination of the regional ethnic 
minorities, the regional constitutions adopt an ethnic-territorial strategy. This means that they, 
following the example of the federal constitution, grant their ethnic minorities the right to 
their own sub-regional territorial entity. For, instance the Nuer, Anuak and Mejenger have 
 
51 Lovise Aalen, Institutionalising the politics of ethnicity – Actors, powers and mobilisation in southern 
Ethiopia under ethnic federalism (Oslo: University of Oslo PhD thesis, 2008), p. 164. 
52 Asnake Kefale, ‘Federalism and Autonomy Conflicts in the Benishangul-Gumuz Region, Ethiopia,’ in Eva 
Brems and Christophe Van der Beken (eds.), Federalism and the Protection of Human Rights in Ethiopia 
(Münster: Lit Verlag, 2008), pp. 192-193. 
53 Sarah Vaughan, Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia (Edinburgh: The University of Edinburgh PhD thesis, 2003), 
p. 171. 
54 Jon Abbink, ‘Ethnicity and Conflict Generation in Ethiopia: Some Problems and Prospects of Ethno-Regional 
Federalism,’ Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 24, Nr. 3 (2006), p. 394.  
55 Christophe Van der Beken, The Ethiopian Federal State Structure and the Accommodation of Ethnic 
Diversity: A View from the Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region (Ghent: Ghent University Non-
Western Law Working Paper, 2003), p. 14; Sarah Vaughan and Kjetil Tronvoll, The Culture of Power in 
Contemporary Ethiopian Political Life (Sida studies n° 10, 2003), p.112. 
56 The rather absurd consequence of the current provisions is that ethnic groups with only a few thousand 
members have the right to form their own regional or even independent state. 
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their own ‘Administration of Nationalities’ in Gambella; the Agew Himra, Agew Awi and 
Oromo have their own ‘Nationality Administration’ in Amhara and in the Southern region all 
nations, nationalities and peoples have a right to their own ‘Zone’ or ‘Special Woreda 
(district)’. However, in the Southern region with its 50+ ethnic groups, only thirteen Zones 
and eight Special Woreda have been established so far.57 This implies that some ethnic groups 
now have their own Zone/Special Woreda, that a number of ethnic groups are a minority in a 
Zone/Special Woreda dominated by a particular group and that the remaining ethnic groups 
are living together in multi-ethnic Zones. Taking into account the above-mentioned current 
attitude of the EPRDF towards ethnic rights and the reform of the Southern ruling party the 
SEPDF into the SEPDM, it should not be surprising that the government is not particularly 
enthusiastic about creating new Zones/Special Woreda. The reluctance of the EPRDF was, for 
instance, obvious in the process that ultimately led to the creation of a separate Silte Zone in 
2001 and the 2000 split up of the Simien (north) Omo Zone into three Zones (Wolayita, 
Dawro, Gamogoffa) and two Special Woreda (Basketo and Konta).58 In practice, the EPRDF 
today focuses on unity, based on the traditional Marxist-Leninist view that granting ethnic 
rights will lead to a neutralization of ethnicity.59 However, as argued above, the contrary is 
true. This means that conflict can only be prevented - and unity can only be achieved - if the 
ethnic rights included in the constitution are effectively protected. This is not to say that the 
territorial approach is a perfect mechanism to do this. Yes, the territorial approach was 
necessary to accommodate certain ethnic demands and in the future it can still be used, but it 
also holds various disadvantages. Firstly, the regional constitutions grant the right to a sub-
regional territorial entity exclusively to the endogenous nations, nationalities and peoples. 
Indeed, the regional constitutions differentiate between endogenous and non-endogenous 
groups. Endogenous groups are considered to be groups of the region, groups of the soil, so to 
speak. Non-endogenous groups have migrated to the region in the more recent past. For 
instance, the Amhara are endogenous in the Amhara region, but non-endogenous in the 
Southern region. The Oromo are endogenous in Oromia, but non-endogenous in Benishangul-
Gumuz. The differentiation between endogenous and non-endogenous groups is a result of the 
ethnic-territorial premise of the constitutional drafter; all ethnic groups can be linked to 
particular territories/regions. Secondly, the endogenous ethnic groups are not always 
concentrated in a specific territory, so that many members of a group might live outside their 
sub-regional territorial entity. Finally, the establishment of new sub-regional territorial entities 
will lead to a dispersion of scarce resources, thus undermining government efficiency. It is 
therefore argued that constitutional revisions are in order, not to abolish the territorial strategy 
but to adapt and complement it with other mechanisms. Firstly, the Southern constitution 
should not grant each endogenous ethnic group the right to its own Zone/Special Woreda. As 
has been argued above, different rights should be given to different categories of ethnic 
                                                 
57 Information provided to the author by the Ministry of Federal Affairs, Addis Ababa, August 2007. 
58 For further information on the Silte case, see: Lahra Smith, ‘Voting for an ethnic identity: procedural and 
institutional responses to ethnic conflict in Ethiopia,’ Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 45, 4 (2007), pp. 
565-594. For further information on the North Omo case: Sarah Vaughan, ‘Responses to Ethnic Federalism in 
Ethiopia’s Southern Region,’ in David Turton (ed.), Ethnic Federalism – The Ethiopian Experience in 
Comparative Perspective (Oxford: James Currey, 2006), pp. 189-194. 
59 Vaughan and Tronvoll, pp. 118-119.  
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groups. Furthermore, in addition to territorial autonomy, ethnic groups should also have the 
right to non-territorial autonomy. In the case of non-territorial autonomy, autonomy is not 
granted to a certain territorial entity, but to the ethnic group as such.60 Autonomy rights are 
enjoyed by all members of the group regardless of where they live in the territory of the 
state.61 The powers that now belong to the territorial administrations in the areas related to 
ethnic identity protection (i.e. powers in the field of language, culture and education) would 
be transferred to the non-territorial administrations. This would solve both the problem of the 
endogenous minorities and the imperfect overlap between territorial and ethnic borders. For 
the Amhara, for instance, this would mean that in addition to their territorial administration - 
the Amhara region – they would also have a non-territorial administration. This 
administration would be responsible for areas related to identity protection for all Amhara, no 
matter where they live in Ethiopia. Although this approach goes radically against the 
territorial approach that is prevalent in Ethiopia, I argue that it does not go against the 
foundations of the constitution as expressed in the primordial position and the rights of 
nations, nationalities and peoples. As discussed in section 2.2.3, the initial approach of the 
TPLF towards the ethnic issue, with its emphasis on ethnic rights, corresponded more with the 
views of the Austro-Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer than with the opinion of Lenin and 
Stalin who subjugated the national struggle to the class struggle. This initial approach is also 
reflected in the constitution, as argued in section 3.2.1. Due to their focus on ethnic identity 
rather than class identity, Renner and Bauer developed a model of non-territorial autonomy as 
a mechanism for the accommodation of the diverse ethnic groups in the Austrian-Hungarian 
Empire.62 The constitutional inclusion of non-territorial autonomy would therefore be in line 
with the foundations of the Ethiopian constitution. In order to guarantee unity as well as 
diversity, it would furthermore be advisable to link non-territorial autonomy with political 
participation (e.g. through guaranteed representation, minority vetoes) in the territorial 
dministrations. 
. Conclusion
a
 
4  
                                                
 
The way Ethiopia, through its constitution, approaches its population’s ethnic diversity is 
quite special in the African context. Though this constitutional approach has its origin in 
Marxism-Leninism, the protection of ethnic rights it includes makes the Ethiopian state 
building strategy fit in with recent trends in international law. Consequently, Ethiopian 
federalism should not be a priori rejected and, in fact, it is my belief that it does have the 
potential to guarantee unity and stability, through the protection of diversity, in Ethiopia. 
However, this will require political as well as constitutional changes. Firstly, the contradiction 
between form and practice should disappear or, in other words, the ruling party should accept 
 
60 McGarry, p. 425.  
61 Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Autonomy and Protection of Minorities under International Law,’ in Günther Bächler 
(ed.), Federalism against Ethnicity? Institutional, Legal and Democratic Instruments to Prevent Violent Minority 
Conflicts (Chur/Zürich: Verlag Rüegger, 1997), p. 89. 
62 Ephraim Nimni, ‘Introduction: the national cultural autonomy model revisited,’ in Ephraim Nimni (ed.), 
National Cultural Autonomy and its Contemporary Critics (London/New York: Routledge, 2005), p. 2; 
Christoph Emminghaus, Äthiopiens ethnoregionaler Föderalismus – Modell der Konfliktbewältigung für 
afrikanische Staaten? (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1997), p. 47-48.  
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f mechanisms that focus on integration 
(e.g. political participation, non-territorial autonomy).  
the consequences of the constitutional choices. The constitutional grant of extensive ethnic 
rights on the one hand and the political limits to their implementation on the other is an 
important conflict generating factor. However, in order for it to be able to achieve unity in 
diversity, the constitutional framework also needs some changes. Most notably, the strong 
emphasis on separateness (e.g. through the right to territorial autonomy at different levels) 
should be reduced and countered by the development o
